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Using a sample of borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under 
Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, this study compares various features of loan 
contracts between firms with ICW and those without ICW. Our results show the following. 
First, the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by about 28 basis 
points, after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Second, firms 
with more severe, company-level ICW pay significantly higher loan rates than those with less 
severe, account-level ICW. Third, lenders impose tighter nonprice terms on firms with ICW 
than on those without ICW. Fourth, fewer lenders are attracted to loan contracts involving 
firms with ICW. Finally, our within-firm analyses show that banks increase loan rates charged 
to ICW firms after their disclosure of internal control problems and that banks reduce loan 
rates after firms remediate previously reported ICW.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to a series of corporate failures and accounting scandals that started with 
the Enron debacle and the subsequent Andersen collapse, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002. Section 404 of SOX (SOX 404) requires company 
management to assess the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting and to 
provide periodic auditor-attested evaluations of internal control effectiveness. The major 
rationale behind this requirement is that lack of adequate internal controls leads to poor 
financial reporting and increases information risk, which in turn increases the cost of external 
financing (e.g., U.S. House of Representatives 2005). 
Several studies have examined the impact of material internal control weakness (ICW) 
on information uncertainty and the cost of capital from the perspective of equity stakeholders, 
and the evidence provided is mixed (e.g., Ogneva et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008; 
Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009). For example, using a sample of SOX 
404 filers with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Ogneva et al. (2007) 
find no significant differences in their implied cost of equity estimates between ICW firms 
and non-ICW firms. In contrast, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) report that ICW firms exhibit 
significantly higher beta risk and cost of equity capital than non-ICW firms, suggesting that 
information risk arising from ICW is priced in the stock market. However, previous research 
has paid little attention to the economic consequences of internal control quality from the 
perspective of credit stakeholders. To help fill this void, our study aims to provide systematic 
evidence on the effects of ICW on bank loan contracting. Specifically, our analyses focus on 
the manner in which ICW impacts various features of loan contracts, such as loan spreads, 
collateral requirements, restrictive covenants, and the number of lenders for a loan. 
We are motivated to examine the loan contracting consequences of ICW for several 
reasons. First, bank loans are a major source of external financing in the United States and 
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most other countries (e.g., Graham et al. 2008).1 Thus, it is economically important to 
investigate whether internal control quality is associated with the cost of bank loans. This 
investigation has the potential to provide evidence on the benefit of maintaining and reporting 
internal control effectiveness according to SOX 404. Second, measurement errors inherent in 
the implied cost of equity estimates can lead to the inconclusive results of prior research on 
the relation between ICW and the cost of capital.2 In contrast, the cost of private debt is 
observed directly through loan contract terms and is subject to fewer measurement errors. 
This allows us to make a cleaner inference about the impact of ICW on the cost of external 
financing. Finally, multifaceted features of loan contracts provide a unique opportunity to 
assess not only the direct cost of ICW (i.e., higher loan spreads), but also the associated 
indirect cost (i.e., tighter nonprice terms).3 
To provide evidence of the impact of ICW on various features of loan contracts, we 
construct a sample of 3,164 loan facility–years for borrowers that filed SOX 404 disclosures 
with the SEC during 2005–2009. We then compare various features of loan contracts with 
ICW borrowers with those with non-ICW borrowers, after controlling for borrower- and 
loan-specific characteristics deemed to affect the contract terms. Briefly, our main results 
show the following. 
First, we find that the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by 
about 28 basis points (bps) in the full-model regressions, after controlling for other factors 
influencing loan terms, default risk, credit quality, and internal control quality. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that banks take into account internal control over financial 
                                                 
1 Since 1980, bank loans have consistently accounted for more than 50 percent of total debt financing in the 
United States (see Graham et al. 2008). The volume of syndicated loans reached $1.69 trillion in 2007, 
according to the DealScan database.  
2 Various implied cost of equity measures are generally inferred from the current stock price, based on some 
valuation models. Thus, the accuracy of these measures depends critically on the validity of the assumptions and 
structures of the valuation models used. Moreover, some key inputs to the valuation models can also suffer from 
measurement errors. For example, it is widely recognized in the literature that analyst earnings forecasts, a 
proxy for expected future earnings in these models, are biased upward.                                          
3 The restrictive covenants can also limit flexibility in investment decisions or cause the borrower to abandon 
profitable investment projects to comply with them, which increases the indirect cost of debt. 
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reporting when setting the price term of loan contracts. That is, banks view ICW as an 
incrementally significant information risk factor above and beyond traditional credit risk 
factors that increases pre-contract information uncertainty as well as post-contract monitoring 
and re-contracting costs. Our results suggest that the quality of the financial reporting system 
plays an important role in private debt contracting and that information risk incurred by weak 
internal controls cannot be removed by lenders’ access to borrowers’ inside information. 
Second, we find that the nature or severity of material weakness in internal control 
matters in loan contracting. Specifically, we find that borrowers with more severe, 
company-level ICW (e.g., organizational control or governance flaws) pay higher loan rates 
than those with less severe, account-level ICW (e.g., inventory recording flaws and lease 
accounting problems). This finding suggests that lenders are able to differentiate more severe 
ICW problems from less severe ones when designing loan contracts. To some extent, it 
implies that the comparative advantages that banks have in accessing inside information help 
them reduce, but not completely eliminate, the information risk associated with account-level 
control problems, but lenders have more difficulty obtaining useful inside information that 
can help mitigate information risk associated with company-level control problems. 
Third, we find that lenders impose tighter nonprice terms on ICW borrowers than on 
non-ICW borrowers. In particular, we find that the likelihood of a loan being secured by 
collateral is higher for ICW borrowers than for non-ICW borrowers. We also provide 
evidence that collateral and restrictive covenants are used more intensively in loan contracts 
involving borrowers with company-level control problems than in those involving borrowers 
with account-level control problems. Fourth, we find that the number of lenders in each loan 
is smaller for loans to ICW borrowers than for those to non-ICW borrowers, consistent with 
the theory that information asymmetries between the borrower and potential lenders attract 
fewer lenders in a loan syndicate (e.g., Sufi 2007). 
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Fourth, using a sample of firms that initiate similar loans both before and after their 
first-time internal control disclosures under SOX 404, we conduct within-firm analyses and 
find that the loan spreads charged to ICW firms significantly increase after SOX 404 
disclosures, while the loan spreads charged to non-ICW firms significantly decrease after 
SOX 404 disclosures. This suggests that SOX 404 disclosures provide new information to the 
private debt market regarding a borrower’s information risk. Moreover, we show that firms 
enjoy a meaningful reduction in the cost of bank loans after they remediate previously 
reported ICW problems, consistent with the equity market evidence documented by 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009). 
Finally, we find that the number of financial covenants imposed on loans to both ICW 
and non-ICW firms decreases after SOX 404 disclosures. In a concurrent study, Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) find that the number of financial covenants decreases after a 
firm discloses ICW under SOX Section 302 (SOX 302). The authors interpret this result as 
evidence that ICW disclosure per se leads to decreased use of financial covenants. However, 
because Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) include only ICW firms in their sample, 
their within-firm analysis seems to be missing a control condition, which could limit the 
inferences they may draw from their analysis.4 We conjecture that the decreased use of 
financial covenants for both ICW and non-ICW firms could be driven, at least partially, by a 
general regulatory effect of SOX.5  
This study contributes to the existing literature in at least three ways. First, our study 
adds to the literature on the economic consequences of the quality of the financial reporting 
system in the debt market. Unlike studies of debt contracting that rely on researchers’ 
self-constructed reporting quality proxies (e.g., Bharath et al. 2008), we use auditor-attested 
                                                 
4 See Section VI for detailed discussions.  
5 For example, the improved general information environment and governance by SOX could reduce the need 
for bank monitoring through financial covenants. In our tests, we do find that the number of financial covenants 
decreases more (significant at the ten percent level) for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms. However, this could 
be interpreted as evidence that the general regulatory impact of SOX on ICW firms is more pronounced because 
of their higher ex ante information asymmetry.  
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evaluations of material weakness in internal control, a direct signal of a low-quality financial 
reporting system. Our results suggest that the quality of the financial reporting system plays 
an important role in the private debt market, even though the lenders in this market have 
superior information processing capabilities and better access to borrowers’ inside 
information. Our study is related to Bharath et al. (2008) and Graham et al. (2008), which 
show that accrual quality and financial restatement are associated with the cost of private debt. 
We show that our results remain the same after controlling for accrual quality and financial 
restatement. This finding suggests that our results are largely driven by the dimensions of a 
firm’s information system quality that is incremental to the accounting quality measures used 
in prior research.6 
The concurrent studies by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2011) also examine the relation between ICW and cost of debt. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find 
that the cost of debt increases after the disclosure of a material weakness in an initial SOX 
404 report, which is consistent with our within-firm analysis. A key difference between our 
study and Dhaliwal et al. (2011) is that their analysis focuses on the credit spread in the 
secondary bond market (i.e., public debt market), whereas our approach focuses on the cost 
of debt in the primary bank loan market (i.e., private debt market).7 In addition, Dhaliwal et 
al. (2011) use change analysis, while our study conducts both cross-sectional and change 
analyses. Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) examine the impact of ICW disclosures 
on the cost of bank loans and report somewhat similar findings to our within-firm analysis. 
An important feature that distinguishes their study from ours is that their focus is on 
unaudited SOX 302 disclosures, whereas ours is on auditor-attested SOX 404 disclosures. We 
                                                 
6 Section II provides in-depth discussions on the incremental usefulness of our study in establishing the 
empirical link between accounting quality (or, more generally, information risk) and cost of debt.  
7 As discussed further in Section II, unlike investors in the bond market, banks have comparative advantages in 
accessing borrowers’ inside information. For example, Fama (1985) argues that banks have superior information 
due to their access to information from an organization’s decision process not otherwise publicly available. In 
contrast, public debt holders (e.g., investors of publicly traded bonds) rely mostly on publicly available 
information. 
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argue that, compared to SOX 302 disclosures, auditor-attested SOX 404 disclosures are more 
reliable indicators of a firm’s financial reporting system quality. Moreover, as their study 
investigates only the temporal changes in loan terms for ICW firms, they are unable to 
provide evidence on the differences in various loan features between loans to ICW firms and 
loans to non-ICW firms.  
Second, our study contributes to the loan contracting literature as well. Evidence 
reported in this study suggests that information risk associated with ICW is a priced risk 
factor that is distinct from traditional credit risk factors. Our results also show that banks not 
only incorporate ICW information into loan contract terms, but they are also able to 
differentiate between company- and account-level ICW problems when designing loan 
contracts and monitoring post-contract credit quality. 
Finally, our study provides new evidence on the benefits of SOX 404 internal control 
disclosure in the private debt market, and thus contributes to the debate on the costs and 
benefits of SOX 404 compliance. The combined empirical evidence in Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2009), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), and our study suggests that SOX 404 disclosure is informative 
to stakeholders in the equity market, the public debt market, and the private debt market. 
Section II develops research hypotheses. Section III presents the empirical model for 
hypothesis testing. Section IV describes the sample and data sources, presents descriptive 
statistics, and discusses univariate results. Section V reports the results of multivariate tests 
on the impact of ICW on price and nonprice terms and the number of lenders. Section VI 
reports the results of within-firm analyses and various robustness checks. Section VII 
concludes. 
II. MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES 
Duffie and Lando (2001) develop a theory that information risk faced by lenders is 
incremental to borrower default risk. Their analysis indicates that credit suppliers require 
compensation not only for fundamental credit risk but also for imperfect information-related 
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risk. Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2007) develop similar theoretical 
predictions on the relation between information risk and cost of capital. Several recent 
empirical studies provide evidence supporting the above theories. For example, using accrual 
quality as an inverse measure of information risk, Francis et al. (2005) show that accrual 
quality is negatively related to a firm’s average cost of debt. Similarly, Bharath et al. (2008) 
find that banks charge lower loan spreads and impose less stringent nonprice terms for firms 
with higher accrual quality. Finally, Graham et al. (2008) show that borrowers that restate 
their financial statements tend to be given unfavorable loan contract terms. 
Our study extends the above research by examining the relation between ICW and 
bank loan contracting. We posit that weak internal controls introduce both intentional 
reporting biases and unintentional accounting errors into the financial reporting process, 
thereby increasing information risk and the cost of bank loans (PCAOB 2007). Despite the 
findings of previous research that ICW is related to accrual quality (e.g., Doyle et al. 2007b; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) and that accrual quality is associated with the cost of debt 
(Bharath et al. 2008), our research is useful for several reasons. 
First, the implications from accrual quality research are limited by the potential 
inaccuracy inherent in the accrual quality measures used; their accuracy relies typically on 
the validity of (discretionary) accrual models, which have been attracting increasing 
criticism.8 Given the problems inherent in accrual quality measures, the empirical link 
between accounting information quality and cost of debt is far from settled. On the other hand, 
a SOX 404 auditor-attested evaluation of an internal control system is a relatively less 
ambiguous accounting quality measure (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009). Thus, examining 
the relation between ICW and the cost of bank loans is a useful exercise to further our 
understanding of the impact of accounting system quality on the cost of debt. 
                                                 
8 See Dechow et al. (2010) for a comprehensive discussion on the problems of the various accrual quality 
measures. 
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Second, even if accrual quality is measured without error, such a measure captures 
only the quality of the bottom line item of a firm’s external financial reports. However, there 
is much more information in a firm’s financial reports than just earnings numbers. For 
example, given their superior information processing capability, banks can overcome the 
problem of low-quality accruals by carefully examining the information in the notes to the 
financial statements. In contrast, ICW disclosures reflect the quality of a firm’s entire 
information production system, which will, in turn, affect the quality of a variety of 
information items in the financial reports, including notes to financial statements and many 
other non-bottom-line items. 
Third, unlike arms-length investors in the equity and bond markets, commercial banks 
and other private lenders have comparative advantages in accessing borrowers’ inside 
information that is useful for mitigating pre-contract information uncertainty and 
post-contract monitoring problems (Fama 1985; Cole 1998; Rajan 1992; Denis and Mihov 
2003; Bharath et al. 2008). As a result, banks may be able to overcome information problems 
associated with poor-quality financial reporting at a relatively low cost. This implies that the 
quality of a firm’s external financial reporting may be of lesser importance to banks than to 
widely dispersed equity and/or bondholders. However, the proxies used in the literature 
capture only the quality of externally reported earnings (e.g., accrual quality; restatements). 
In contrast, a firm’s internal control system can affect the quality of its inside information as 
well as information in externally oriented financial reports. For example, Feng et al. (2009) 
find that management earnings guidance is less accurate for firms with ICW, suggesting that 
ICW affects the quality of internal reports used by managers. The authors argue that even 
insiders cannot overcome problems arising from ineffective internal controls. Thus, we argue 
that ICW is a comprehensive information quality indicator that is able to capture the quality 
of both inside and publicly reported accounting information. 
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Overall, we believe that ICW is a more comprehensive and accurate indicator of a 
firm’s accounting information risk and that establishing the link between ICW and the cost of 
bank loans can provide more convincing evidence for the pricing of accounting information 
risk in the private debt market. Moreover, documenting the benefits of effective internal 
controls and internal control disclosures is interesting in its own right, given the substantial 
cost of SOX 404 compliance. To provide empirical evidence on the role of internal control 
quality in loan pricing, we test the following hypothesis in alternative form: 
H1: Controlling for other determinants, loan spreads are higher for ICW borrowers 
than for non-ICW borrowers. 
Not all internal control material weaknesses have the same nature and potential 
severity. Moody’s Investors Service (2004, 2006, 2007) classifies the various material 
weaknesses into two types, account-level material weaknesses (Category A) and 
company-level material weaknesses (Category B). Account-level material weaknesses relate 
to controls over specific account balances or transaction-level processes, either of which is 
relatively “auditable.” Moody’s is less concerned about this type of material weakness and 
does not expect to take any rating action for firms reporting it. Company-level material 
weaknesses relate to the overall control environment or financial reporting process, and it has 
a pervasive effect on a company’s financial reporting. Moody’s contends that company-level 
material weakness calls into question not only management’s ability to prepare accurate 
financial reports but also its ability to control the business. Thus, Moody’s is more concerned 
about company-level material weakness and more likely to take rating action for firms with 
company-level control problems. 
Consistent with Moody’s arguments, previous research documents that account- and 
company-level material weaknesses have different impacts. For example, Doyle et al. (2007b) 
find that the presence of company-level weakness results in lower accruals quality, but find 
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no significant relation between the presence of account-level weakness and accrual quality. 
This evidence suggests that company-level weakness hampers the quality of financial 
reporting to a greater extent than does account-level weakness. To examine whether the 
nature or severity of ICW matters in loan pricing, we test the second hypothesis in alternative 
form: 
H2: Controlling for other determinants, loan spreads are higher for borrowers with 
company-level ICW than for those with account-level ICW. 
Bank loan contracts include not only the price term (i.e., loan spread), but also various 
nonprice terms, such as collateral requirements and restrictive covenants. Lenders use these 
nonprice terms (as well as the price term) when designing loan contracts in an attempt to 
mitigate (1) agency costs of debt arising from agency conflicts between equity and 
debtholders (Smith and Warner 1979), (2) information problems faced by lenders (Graham et 
al. 2008; Kim et al. 2010), and (3) potential conflicts between lenders and borrowers (Vasvari 
2008). Extant evidence shows that lenders are more likely to require collateral for borrowers 
with opaque information (e.g., Berger and Udell 1990; Rajan and Winston 1995; Jimenez et 
al. 2006). We therefore expect that banks are more likely to require borrowers with ICW 
problems to pledge collateral on their loans. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: Controlling for other determinants, the likelihood of loans being secured by 
collateral is higher for ICW borrowers than for non-ICW borrowers. 
The debt covenant literature indicates that lenders use loan covenants to improve the 
ex post monitoring of changes in credit quality, although the use of covenants also incurs 
costs of reduced flexibility for the borrower (Smith and Warner 1979; Rajan and Winston 
1995; Bradley and Roberts 2004). In particular, Rajan and Winston (1995) show that the 
inclusion of restrictive covenants in loan contracts provides lenders with a strong incentive to 
monitor more closely credit quality subsequent to loan initiations. To the extent that lenders 
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are likely to have higher incentives to monitor the post-contract performance of borrowers 
with poor reporting quality, we expect that restrictive covenants are more intensively used in 
loans involving borrowers with ICW problems than in those involving borrowers without 
such problems. This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Controlling for other determinants, the use of restrictive covenants in loan 
contracts is more intensive and prevalent for ICW borrowers than for non-ICW 
borrowers. 
The syndicate loan literature shows that fewer lenders are involved in a loan deal 
when borrowers have information problems. This occurs because a syndicate structure with 
fewer lenders helps minimize free-rider problems in private information gathering, and 
facilitates ex post monitoring (Dennis and Mullineaux 2000; Sufi 2007). Thus, we expect the 
number of lenders to be smaller for loan contracts with ICW borrowers than for loan 
contracts with non-ICW borrowers. This leads to our final hypothesis: 
H5: Controlling for other determinants, the number of lenders in a loan deal is smaller 
for ICW borrowers than for non-ICW borrowers. 
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To evaluate the impact of ICW on various features of loan contracting, we specify the 
following regression model: 
Loan Feature = α0 + α1Weak + α2Loan-specific Control + α3Borrower-specific Control  
+ α4Economy-wide Control + (Year Indicators) + (industry Indicators) + error,     (1) 
where, for each loan facility and borrowing firm, all variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
The dependent variable, Loan Feature, refers to one of the following features of a loan 
contract: (1) the price term, namely, the drawn all-in spread (AIS); (2) the nonprice terms, 
including the likelihood of the loan being secured by collateral (DSecured), the number of 
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financial covenants included in each loan (FinCovIndex), and the number of general 
covenants included in each loan (GenCovIndex); and (3) the number of lenders involved in 
the loan deal (NLenders). 
The variable AIS proxies for the interest cost of borrowing and is measured by the 
drawn all-in spread (plus the upfront fee and annual fee, if any) in basis points in excess of 
the benchmark rate, that is, the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR). The test variable 
Weak is an indicator variable that equals one if the auditor concludes in the SOX 404 report 
filed with the SEC that the borrower’s internal control over financial reporting is ineffective 
for the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. When AIS is used as the dependent variable, that is, 
Loan Feature in Eq. (1), the coefficient on Weak captures the difference in the loan spread 
charged to borrowers with ICW problems vis-à-vis those without such problems.9 Therefore, 
hypothesis H1 implies α1 > 0. Similarly, hypothesis H3 (H4) is supported if we observe α1 > 
0 when the dependent variable is DSecured (FinCovIndex or GenCovIndex). Hypothesis H5 
implies α1 < 0 when the dependent variable is NLenders. 
To test whether company-level ICW differs systematically from account-level ICW in 
terms of its impact on loan contracting features (H2),10 we also estimate Eq. (1) after 
replacing Weak by two indicator variables, Company ICW and Account ICW, which equal one 
for borrowers that report any company-level ICW (and borrowers with incomplete internal 
control assessment)11 and for those that report any account-level weakness, respectively, and 
zero otherwise. Hypothesis H2 is supported if the coefficient on Company ICW is greater 
than that on Account ICW. 
                                                 
9 We define a borrower as a non-ICW firm if its external auditor concludes that the firm maintains, in all 
material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting in the annual report. 
10 In our study, company-level ICW includes problems related to inadequate disclosure control, an ineffective or 
understaffed audit committee, lack of senior management competency and tone, ineffective internal audit 
function, ineffective personnel, and the segregation of duties, while account-level control weaknesses include all 
other weaknesses. 
11 Moody’s Investors Service (2006, 2007) argues that the inability to complete the Section 404 report is itself a 
company-level control weakness that generally merits rating committee consideration. Thus, we view firms that 
did not finish internal control assessments as having company-level weaknesses. In our sample, only two firms 
fall into this category. Excluding these two firms from the sample does not change our empirical results.   
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The loan contracting literature shows that several loan-specific characteristics are 
related to the interest cost of borrowing (e.g., Strahan 1999; Dennis et al. 2000; Bharath et al. 
2008; Graham et al. 2008; Vasvari 2008; Kim et al. 2010). We include in Eq. (1) a set of 
loan-level control variables, that is, Log Maturity, Log Loan Size, Log NLenders, and 
Performance Pricing, when examining the effect of ICW on loan spreads. The variable Log 
Maturity is the natural log of loan maturity in months, and Log Loan Size is measured by the 
natural log of the dollar amount of each loan facility given to a borrower. Previous research 
finds that lenders charge lower interest rates for shorter-maturity loans and larger loan 
facilities (e.g., Graham et al. 2008). Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient for Log 
Maturity and a negative coefficient for Log Loan Size. The variable Log NLenders is the 
natural log of the number of lenders in a loan deal, and Performance Pricing is an indicator 
variable that equals one for loans with performance pricing provisions, and zero otherwise. 
We expect loan contracts involving larger numbers of lenders and performance pricing 
provisions to have lower interest rates. 
We also control for a set of borrower-specific variables that are known to affect credit 
quality and, thus, loan contract terms: Size, Leverage, MB, Profitability, Tangibility, and 
CashVol. The variables Size and Leverage are measured by the natural log of total assets and 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, respectively. We expect Size (Leverage) to be 
positively (negatively) related to credit quality. The variable MB is the market value of equity 
plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. To the extent that MB 
proxies for a borrower’s growth potential, MB is likely to be positively associated with credit 
quality. However, growing firms are often faced with high risk. In such a case, MB is likely to 
be inversely associated with credit quality. The variable Profitability refers to earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets; Tangibility 
is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) to total assets; and CashVol refers to the 
standard deviation of quarterly cash flows from operations (scaled by yearly total assets) over 
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the past five fiscal years. We expect Profitability and Tangibility to be positively associated 
with credit quality, and CashVol to be inversely associated with credit quality. 
To control for borrower default risk, we construct a comprehensive measure of default 
risk incorporating three default risk proxies that have been widely used in the literature: 
Altman’s (1968) Z-score, Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, and Shumway’s (2001) probability of 
bankruptcy. Specifically, we apply principal component analysis to the three proxies and 
extract the first principal component, which is defined as12 
DefaultRisk = –0.7999×Z-Score+0.8948×O-Score+0.6239×Probability of Bankruptcy 
We then rank it in each fiscal year and use the decile rank value (RDefaultRisk) as our default 
risk measure in our regression analyses. This ranked measure is constructed in such a way 
that a higher value of RDefaultRisk represents a higher default risk. 
Hammersley et al. (2008) show that ICW disclosures are often accompanied by 
restatements. Further, Graham et al. (2008) document that loans initiated after restatements 
have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihoods of loans being 
secured by collateral, and more covenant restrictions. Thus, restatements may be an important 
confounding factor in our study.13 To ensure that our results are not driven by the effect of 
financial restatements, we include in our model an indicator variable, Restate, which equals 
one if the firm restates its financial statements in the year of ICW disclosure. Moreover, 
Bharath et al. (2008) find that accrual quality affects the terms of bank loan contracts. To 
alleviate the concern that our results may simply pick up the effects of accrual quality on the 
cost of debt, we also control for accrual quality (AbsAccr) in our regression model. The 
                                                 
12 Here, Z-Score = 1.2×(working capital/total assets) + 1.4×(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3×(EBIT/total 
assets) + 0.6×(market value of equity/total liabilities) + 0.999×(sales/total assets); O-Score = –1.32 – 
0.407×log(total assets) + 6.03×(total liabilities/total assets) – 1.43×(working capital/total assets + 0.076×(current 
liabilities/current assets) – 1.72×(1 if total liabilities>total assets, 0 otherwise) – 2.37×(net income/total assets) – 
1.83×(operating income before depreciation/total liabilities) + 0.285×(1 if net income is negative for the last two 
years, 0 otherwise) – 0.521×((net incomet-net incomet-1)/(|net incomet|+|net incomet-1|)); and Probability of 
Bankruptcy = ew/(1+ew), where w = –13.303 – 1.982×(net income/total assets) + 3.593×(total liabilities/total 
assets) – 0.467×log(firm’s market capitalization/total market capitalization) – 1.809×excess stock return over the 
value-weighted index return in the past 12 months + 5.791×stock return volatility in the past 12 months. 
13 Note, however, that a restatement is in itself a reflection of ineffective internal controls.  
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variable AbsAccr is estimated using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995), allowing 
for accounting conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 2006). 
Previous research has identified additional firm characteristics that are possible 
determinants of ICW (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007a). To the extent that 
these variables are correlated with both ICW and loan contract terms, their omission could 
create a problem of correlated omitted variables. To avoid this problem, we also control for 
the following additional firm characteristics: auditor quality (Big 4), firm age (Age), the 
number of the firm’s business segments (NSegment), inventory holdings (Inventory), a firm’s 
involvement in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), organizational change (Restructure), the 
existence of foreign sales (Foreign), sales growth (SaleGrowth), and the presence of 
aggregate loss (Loss).14 
In addition, we include two economy-wide variables, Credit Spread and Term Spread, 
to control for the potential effects of macroeconomic conditions on loan contracting. Here 
Credit Spread is the difference in yield between BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bonds, while 
Term Spread is the difference in yield between 10-year and two-year U.S. Treasury bonds. 
Finally, we include Loan Type Indicators and Loan Purpose Indicators to control for 
potential differences in the price and nonprice terms of loan contracts associated with the 
different types and purposes of loans. We also include Industry Indicators and Year 
Indicators to control for potential differences in loan features across industries and over 
years. 
IV. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample and Data Sources 
Our initial sample consists of all public companies that have bank loan data in the 
Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan database for the five-year period 2005–2009. The 
DealScan loan data are compiled for each transaction or deal. Each deal, which is a loan 
                                                 
14 Refer to the Appendix for detailed definitions of these variables. 
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contract between a borrower and bank(s) at a specific date, can have only one facility or a 
package of several facilities with different price and nonprice terms.15 We consider each 
facility as a separate observation for our sample, as many loan characteristics and loan 
spreads vary across facilities. We then require that borrowers’ SOX 404 disclosures are 
available from the Audit Analytics database before loans are initiated. The SOX 404 
disclosure file from Audit Analytics provides information on the identities of disclosing 
companies, overall internal control effectiveness, filing dates, types and reasons of 
deficiencies, and so forth. We obtain borrowers’ financial statement data from Compustat. 
Bank loan data are merged with the most recently disclosed internal control and financial 
statement data for the fiscal year before loans are initiated. The procedure ensures that the 
Weak measure reflects an observable result of SOX 404 compliance. We exclude financial 
companies from our sample and require that all loan facilities in our sample be senior debts. 
With regard to the types of loans, our sample includes term loans, revolvers, and 364-day 
facilities, but excludes bridge loans and non-fund-based facilities, such as leases and standby 
letters of credit. Our final sample includes 3,164 facility–years for 1,363 firms over the 
2005–2009 period. Table 1 presents the sample selection procedure and the distribution of 
loan facilities in our sample by year and loan type. As shown in Table 1, Panel B, about 67.70 
percent of loan facilities in our sample are revolvers, while about 28.03 percent and 4.27 
percent are term loans and 364-day facilities, respectively. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all loan-specific variables at the 
facility level, while Panel B reports descriptive statistics for our test variables and all 
borrower-specific variables considered in this study. As shown in Table 2, Panel A, the mean 
and median of the drawn all-in spread over the LIBOR (i.e., AIS) are around 186 and 150 bps, 
                                                 
15 For instance, a deal can comprise a line of credit facility and a term loan with different interest rates. 
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respectively, with a standard deviation of about 159 bps. The mean (median) maturity is 
about 53 (60) months, while the mean (median) facility size is $478 million ($200 million). 
On average, 59.5 percent of the loan facilities in our sample have a performance pricing 
provision, while 68.1 percent of them have collateral. The mean and median numbers of 
restrictive covenants included in each loan contract are about 1.65 and 2.00, respectively, for 
financial covenants, and about 3.73 and 3.00, respectively, for general covenants. Most of the 
loan facilities in our sample are syndicated loans involving, on average, nine lenders. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
As shown in Table 2, Panel B, about 9.6 of borrowers in the sample have a material 
weakness in internal control, as concluded by the auditor report under SOX 404. About 5.4 
percent (4.2 percent) of facility–years in our sample have company-level (account-level) 
weaknesses. The Size variable is reasonably distributed, with a mean and median of 7.32 and 
7.25, respectively. The mean (median) market-to-book ratio is 1.93 (1.53). On average, 
long-term debt, EBITDA, and tangible assets (i.e., PP&E) are about 23 percent, 13 percent, 
and 31 percent of total assets, respectively. 
Univariate Comparisons 
We first partition the full sample into two subsamples: (1) borrowers with ICW 
problems (N = 304) and (2) borrowers without ICW problems (N = 2,860). We then compare 
the differences in loan features and borrower characteristics between the two subsamples. As 
shown in Panel A of Table 3, the mean and median of the drawn all-in spread (AIS) are about 
252 and 200 bps, respectively, for ICW borrowers, while they are about 179 and 150 bps, 
respectively, for non-ICW borrowers. Both the mean and median differences are significant at 
the one percent level, suggesting that lenders charge significantly higher loan rates to ICW 
borrowers than to non-ICW borrowers. With respect to other loan features, we find that, 
compared with loans to non-ICW borrowers, loans to ICW borrowers are smaller, have more 
covenants, and are more likely to be secured by collateral. We also find that ICW borrowers 
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attract significantly fewer lenders (NLenders) than do non-ICW borrowers. Regarding 
borrower-specific characteristics, we find that, compared with borrowers without ICW 
problems, borrowers with ICW problems are smaller and younger, have lower growth 
potential, lower profitability, lower accrual quality, and higher likelihoods of default and loss, 
and are more likely to have foreign sales and undergoing organizational changes. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
To further examine whether the nature or severity of ICW matters, we partition the 
ICW sample (N = 304) into two subsamples: a sample of ICW borrowers with company-level 
weakness (N = 171) and a sample of ICW borrowers with account-level weakness (N = 133). 
As shown in Table 4, Panel B, ICW borrowers with company-level weakness pay 
significantly higher interest rates, as reflected in higher AIS values, and have a higher 
likelihood of pledging collateral on their loans, compared with ICW borrowers with 
account-level weakness. 
Correlation Matrix 
Table 4 reports Pearson correlation coefficients among selected loan- and 
borrower-specific variables. As shown in Table 4, AIS is positively correlated with Weak at 
the one percent level, suggesting that banks charge higher loan rates to ICW borrowers than 
to non-ICW borrowers. We also find that the correlation coefficient between AIS and 
Company ICW (0.13, significant at the one percent level) is much greater than that between 
AIS and Account ICW (0.04, significant at the five percent level). Though only indicative of 
the underlying relation, this finding suggests that lenders are able to differentiate between 
borrower types based upon the nature or severity of ICW. The Weak variable has negative 
correlations with Size and Profitability, while it has positive correlations with Leverage and 
RDefaultRisk. The variable AIS is negatively correlated with Log Maturity, Log Loan Size, 
Log Lenders, and Performance Pricing, while it is positively correlated with DSecured, 
FinCovIndex, and GenCovIndex. 
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[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
V. REGRESSION RESULTS 
ICW and Loan Spread: Test of H1 
Table 5 reports the results of our main regression in Eq. (1), using AIS as the 
dependent variable. In column 1 of Table 5, we regress AIS on the test variable Weak with the 
full set of control variables discussed in Section III. All reported t-values are based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). As reported in 
column 1 of Table 5, the coefficient on Weak is significantly positive at the one percent level, 
consistent with the prediction of H1. This result supports the view that internal control quality 
plays an important role in private debt contracting: Banks are unable to completely overcome 
information problems associated with weak internal controls, although they have superior 
abilities to collect and process both public and inside information about borrowers. The 
coefficient on Weak in column 1 of Table 5 indicates that, all else equal, the loan spread of 
ICW borrowers is, on average, about 28 bps higher than that of non-ICW borrowers, which is 
both statistically and economically significant.16 
Turning to control variables, we find that loan spread is negatively associated with 
loan facility size, the presence of performance pricing provisions, borrower size, 
market-to-book ratio, and profitability. Also, loan spread is positively associated with 
leverage, cash flow volatility, default risk, losses, term spread, and credit spread. Finally, we 
find that the coefficients on Restate and AbsAccr (accrual quality) are insignificant, albeit 
with expected positive signs.17 All results regarding control variables are largely consistent 
with those of previous studies on loan pricing. 
                                                 
16 As reported in Table 2, the average amount of a loan facility is about $478 million for our sample, and the 
mean maturity is about 53 months, or 4.42 years. This means that, on average, a typical borrower with ICW has 
to pay higher interest expenses, of about $1.35 million per year, than a borrower without ICW over the maturity 
period of 4.42 years. 
17 This result is robust to different measures of accrual quality. Bharath et al. (2008) find that accrual quality is 
related to loan contracting terms for a sample of firms over the period 1988–2003. However, it is possible that 
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[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Company- versus Account-Level Material Weakness: Test of H2 
To test whether banks take into account the nature or severity of material ICW when 
setting loan spreads, we estimate Eq. (1) after replacing Weak by a company-level weakness 
indicator (Company ICW) and an account-level weakness indicator (Account ICW). As shown 
in column 2 of Table 5, the coefficient on Company ICW is significantly positive at the one 
percent level (coefficient = 43.656, t = 3.07), and the coefficient on Account ICW is also 
positive, but insignificant (coefficient = 7.093, t = 0.58). This suggests that ICW borrowers 
with company-level control problems bear higher interest rates than those with account-level 
control problems, which is consistent with H2. To directly test H2, the partial F-test shows 
that the coefficient on Company ICW is significantly larger than that on Account ICW at the 
five percent level (F = 4.34). We interpret the above results as evidence that banks are able to 
overcome information problems associated with account-level ICW, but not those arising 
from company-level ICW. 
ICW and Nonprice Terms: Tests of H3 and H4 
To assess the impact of ICW on the likelihood of a loan being secured by collateral, 
we estimate Eq. (1) with DSecured as the dependent variable, using the probit regression 
procedure. Column 1a of Table 6 presents the results of this probit estimation using Weak as 
the test variable, while column 1b reports the same using Account ICW and Company ICW in 
lieu of Weak. In both columns, we control for loan- and borrower-specific characteristics, 
determinants of ICW, and economy-wide factors. With respect to loan-specific characteristics, 
we include Loan Concentration (the dollar amount of a loan deal divided by total assets) in 
lieu of Log Loan Size (the natural log of the dollar amount of the loan facility), following 
                                                                                                                                                        
the SOX of 2002 changed the relation between accrual quality and the cost of bank loans significantly. Note that 
Hutton et al. (2009) find that accrual quality is related to downside risk only before SOX, and not after. We 
suggest further research on the moderating effect of SOX on the relation between accrual quality and cost of 
debt. 
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prior loan literature (e.g., Bharath et al. 2009). Also, we include Prior Lead as an additional 
control variable to control for prior relationships between lead banks and borrowers. Here 
Prior Lead is an indicator variable that equals one if the lead arranger was a lead arranger for 
the same borrower in previous loan deals during the past five years, and zero otherwise. 
Previous research suggests that banks are more likely to require collateral from borrowers 
that rely heavily on loans, and are less likely to require collateral from borrowers with which 
they have a prior banking relationship (e.g., Bradley and Roberts 2004; Vasvari 2008; 
Bharath et al. 2009). We therefore expect a positive (negative) sign on Loan Concentration 
(Prior Lead). 
As shown in column 1a of Table 6, the coefficient on Weak is significantly positive at 
the five percent level, consistent with hypothesis H3. This finding suggests that lenders are 
more likely to require collateral for borrowers with ICW problems than for those without 
such problems. When Weak is replaced by Account ICW and Company ICW (as shown in 
column 1b of Table 6), however, the coefficient on Company ICW is significantly positive at 
the one percent level, but the coefficient on Account ICW is insignificant. This suggests that 
the positive impact of ICW on the likelihood of a loan being secured by collateral is mainly 
driven by company-level weakness. 
To assess the impact of ICW on the intensity or prevalence of restrictive covenants, 
we manually count the number of financial and general covenants included in each loan deal. 
We find from the DealScan database that there are a total of 30 different covenants, 18 of 
which are financial covenants and 12 of which are general covenants related to restrictions on 
prepayment, dividend, and voting rights, and other restrictions.18 We construct two covenant 
indices, FinCovIndex and GenCovIndex, based on counts of financial and general covenants, 
respectively. We then estimate Eq. (1) with the two covenant indices as the dependent 
                                                 
18 See Bradley and Roberts (2004) for a detailed discussion on a variety of covenant restrictions used in loan 
contracts.  
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variables. In the covenant model, we include the size of the loan deal (Log Deal Size) in lieu 
of the size of the loan facility (Log Loan Size), because loan covenants are imposed at the 
deal level rather than at the facility level. 
Columns 2a and 3a of Table 6 report the results of Poisson regressions of 
FinCovIndex and GenCovIndex, respectively, on Weak and all other control variables, while 
columns 2b and 3b report the same using Account ICW and Company ICW in place of Weak. 
The results show that the coefficients on Weak are significantly positive at the five percent 
(one percent) level in column 2a (3a) of Table 6, consistent with hypothesis H4. Columns 2b 
and 3b of Table 6 show that the coefficient on Account ICW is significant at the ten percent 
level for the general covenant regression, but insignificant for the financial covenant 
regression. On the other hand, the coefficients on Company ICW are significantly positive at 
the five percent and one percent level, respectively, in columns 2b and 3b of Table 6. 
With respect to control variables, the following findings are noteworthy. First, lenders 
are more likely to require collateral and use general covenants for large loans. Second, 
collateral requirements and/or restrictive covenants are less likely to be imposed on loans to 
large firms, while they are more intensively used for loans to highly levered firms, younger 
firms, loss firms, and firms with high cash flow volatility. Third, the presence of performance 
pricing provisions reduces the likelihood of a loan being secured by collateral, while it 
increases the intensity of loan covenants. Finally, prior lead bank–borrower relationships 
(Prior Lead) have a negative effect on the likelihood of loan collateralization, but an 
insignificant effect on the occurrence of restrictive covenants. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Our cross-sectional results regarding the impact of ICW on financial covenants appear 
to be inconsistent with those of Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011). Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) focus only on ICW firms, finding that banks decrease the use of 
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financial covenants after these firms’ disclosure of ICW. In contrast, our cross-sectional tests, 
involving both ICW and non-ICW borrowers, show that lenders impose more financial 
covenants on ICW firms than on non-ICW firms.19 Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) 
claim that because loans to ICW firms have a greater number of financial covenants than 
loans to non-ICW firms even before ICW disclosure, our findings could be due to 
“differences in more fundamental firm characteristics, such as riskiness and information 
opacity”. However, we argue that this is unlikely to be the case for at least two reasons. First, 
in our regression model, we have carefully controlled for proxies of fundamental risk (e.g., 
RDefaultRisk), information opacity (e.g., AbsAccr), and many other firm characteristics. 
Second, we argue that, even without SOX 404 (or 302) ICW disclosures per se, ICW could 
still be priced by banks, so long as banks are able to detect such weaknesses even before SOX 
mandated ICW disclosures. Thus, even if Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) are 
correct that banks impose more financial covenants on ICW firms than on non-ICW firms 
before the SOX-mandated disclosure, the reason could still be weaknesses in internal controls 
rather than “riskiness and information opacity”. Put differently, SOX 404 and 302 are not the 
only sources of information that banks have about borrowers’ internal control effectiveness.20  
ICW and the Number of Lenders: Test of H5 
To test hypothesis H5, we estimate Eq. (1) using as the dependent variable the number 
of lenders (NLenders) involved in each loan deal to which a loan facility pertains. Following 
                                                 
19 One can argue that banks should impose fewer financial covenants on ICW firms, considering such firms’ 
lower reporting quality. We posit two explanations for the positive association between ICW and the number of 
financial covenants. First, by imposing more financial covenants, banks have little to lose. If accounting noise 
causes covenant violations, banks may be better off, because they can exercise their option to take over control 
rights or charge a higher loan rate via renegotiation; if the covenants are not violated due to accounting noise, 
these covenants are, at most, redundant. Second, banks can extract monopoly information rents based on private 
information they generate about the borrower (Rajan 1992). Bharath et al. (2008) argue that banks’ information 
rent extraction is likely to be greater when accounting quality is poor, since poor accounting makes the firm 
more opaque to other outside stakeholders. Therefore, by imposing more financial covenants, banks can have 
more justifications and opportunities to obtain inside information from the borrower and extract information 
rents.  
20  In Section VI, we also conduct within-firm tests and further compare our study to Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011). 
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the prior literature (e.g., Sufi 2007; Ball et al. 2008), we further control for the presence of a 
prior lender–borrower relationship (Prior Lead), the lead arranger’s reputation (Lead 
Reputation), and the availability of an alternative information source (Rated), in addition to 
other loan- and borrower-specific characteristics considered in the loan pricing model. Here 
Lead Reputation is an indicator variable that equals one if at least one of the lead arrangers 
for the loan deal was a top-25 U.S. lead arranger (in terms of loan volume) in the year 
immediately before the initiation of the loan, based on loan data from DealScan, and zero 
otherwise. The variable Rated is an indicator variable that equals one if the borrower has a 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating, and zero otherwise. We 
expect more lenders to be attracted to loans arranged by high-reputation banks and to loans to 
borrowers with external credit ratings by independent agencies. 
Column 4a (4b) of Table 6 reports the results of the Poisson regression of NLenders 
on Weak (Account ICW and Company ICW) and all other control variables. As shown in 
column 5a of Table 6, the coefficient on Weak is significantly negative at the five percent 
level, consistent with H5. When Account ICW and Company ICW are included in lieu of 
Weak, however, the coefficient on Account ICW is insignificant, while the coefficient on 
Company ICW is significantly negative at the five percent level. The above findings suggest 
that lenders take into account the nature or severity of material weakness in internal controls 
when structuring loans. The signs of the coefficients on control variables are largely 
consistent with prior literature. 
VI. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Does SOX 404 ICW Disclosure Contain New Information for Lenders? 
Our cross-sectional tests show that loan features (price term, nonprice terms, and the 
number of lenders) differ significantly between ICW and non-ICW firms. A related but 
distinct issue is whether SOX 404 internal control disclosure contains new information for 
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concentrated lenders with information advantage, such as banks. To examine this issue, we 
compare the features of a firm’s loans initiated immediately before and immediately after 
SOX 404 disclosure. If SOX 404 disclosure provides banks with new information about 
borrowers’ information risk, we expect to observe significant differences in loan features for 
the same firm before and after ICW disclosures under SOX 404. 
In constructing our sample for the within-firm tests, we use each firm’s first-time SOX 
404 disclosure, because the first-time disclosure is likely to provide the most powerful setting 
to observe the effect of SOX 404 disclosures on loan terms. To be included in this sample, a 
firm must have its loans initiated in the two years before its first-time SOX 404 disclosure 
(the pre-SOX 404 period) and the two years after the same disclosure (the post-SOX 404 
period) and these loans must have similar loan characteristics in terms of type, maturity, and 
amount. We match the loans initiated in the pre-SOX 404 period with those initiated in the 
post-SOX 404 period as closely as possible according to the following three loan 
characteristics: loan type (term loan or revolver), loan maturity (with a difference of less than 
12 months), and loan amount (with a difference of less than 100 percent of the smaller loan). 
This matching procedure yields 65 ICW firms that borrow 71 pairs of loan facilities and 373 
non-ICW firms that borrow 446 pairs of loan facilities. For each firm, we calculate the 
average values of loan features, including AIS, DSecured, FinCovIndex, GenCovIndex, and 
NLenders in the pre- and post-SOX 404 periods, and then compute their changes from the 
pre-SOX 404 to the post-SOX 404 period. 
Table 7 presents the mean and median of these changes in loan features. Panel A of 
Table 7 reports the mean and median changes in five loan features for 65 ICW firms, Panel B 
reports the mean and median changes in five loan features for 46 ICW firms that did not 
previously disclose ICW problems under SOX 302, and Panel C reports the mean and median 
changes in five loan characteristics for 373 non-ICW firms. 
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As shown in Table 7, Panel A, the mean AIS change for 65 ICW firms is nearly 23 bps 
and is significant at the ten percent level. This is in line with the view that, on average, loan 
rates charged to ICW firms increase after ICW disclosure under SOX 404. For ICW firms 
that did not disclose ICW under SOX 302 before the first-time SOX 404 disclosure, as 
presented in Table 7, Panel B, the mean (median) AIS changes are about 35 (6) bps, and 
significant at less than the five percent (one percent) level. The stronger AIS increase in Panel 
B than in Panel A of Table 7 suggests that lenders react more to ICW disclosures under SOX 
404 when the disclosures were not made in the past, and thus are more likely to convey new 
information.21 
As reported in Table 7, Panel C, both the mean and median AIS changes for non-ICW 
firms are about –25 bps. These changes are significant at the one percent level, suggesting 
that loan rates charged to non-ICW firms decrease after firms assure the inexistence of ICW 
problems by disclosing auditor-attested effectiveness of internal controls under SOX 404. The 
above results, taken together, suggest that SOX 404 internal control disclosures provide 
banks with new information about borrowers’ information risk; that is, banks are not able to 
completely obtain all information regarding the effectiveness of a firm’s internal control 
system before mandatory SOX 404 disclosure.22 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
With regard to the change in the number of financial covenants, Panels A and B of 
Table 7 show that the mean change in FinCovIndex is significantly negative at the one 
percent level, suggesting that lenders impose fewer financial covenants on loans to ICW 
firms after SOX 404 disclosures. This is consistent with the result of Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), who interpret their similar finding as evidence that lenders use 
                                                 
21 Note that SOX 404 disclosure itself carries some confirmation effect (or feedback value), even if the firm 
previously disclosed ICW through unaudited disclosure. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that banks 
react to a firm’s SOX 404 ICW disclosures even if the firm previously disclosed ICW under SOX 302.   
22 Again, this “new” information can also stem from the confirmation value of the audited internal control 
information. 
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fewer financial covenants for ICW firms because the accounting numbers used in loan 
contracts are less reliable for these firms. As shown in Panel C of Table 7, however, the 
change in the number of financial covenants for non-ICW firms is significantly negative as 
well at the one percent level. This result casts some doubt on the interpretation of Costello 
and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) regarding the decrease in the use of financial covenants for 
ICW firms from the pre- to the post-SOX 404 period. The similar pattern of change in the 
number of financial covenants, that is, ∆FinCovIndex, for both ICW and non-ICW firms 
observed in Panels A through C of Table 7 could be related to lenders’ improved knowledge 
about borrowers: As banks become familiar with a firm over time, it would be less beneficial 
for banks to ex post monitor the firm, using financial covenants.  
Moreover, the decreased use of financial covenants for both ICW and non-ICW firms 
could also be driven, at least partially, by a general regulatory effect of SOX. That is, 
SOX-mandated regulations could have improved the overall information environment and 
corporate governance of U.S. firms, and, thus, could have reduced the need for bank 
monitoring through financial covenants. In addition, we find that the number of financial 
covenants decreases more (significant at the ten percent level) for ICW firms than for 
non-ICW firms. This difference could be interpreted as evidence that the general regulatory 
impact of SOX on ICW firms is more pronounced because ICW firms are likely to have 
higher ex ante information asymmetry.23,24 
In addition, Panel B of Table 7 shows that the mean change in DSecured is positive 
and weakly significant at the ten percent level, while the mean change in NLenders is 
negative and weakly significant at the ten percent level. This result suggests that loans to 
ICW firms (under SOX 404) that did not disclose ICW under SOX 302 are more likely to be 
                                                 
23 In the extreme case, bank monitoring through covenants will not be necessary for a firm with absolute ex ante 
transparency, and, thus, SOX will not have an impact on such firms.   
24 Given these conjectures, we believe that both the cross-sectional test and the time-series test have their own 
merits and limitations. Thus, it seems necessary to conduct both tests to obtain a more complete picture of the 
relation between ICW and bank loan contracting.  
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secured by collateral and attract fewer lenders. In Panel C of Table 7, we also find that fewer 
general covenants are imposed on loans to non-ICW firms in the post-SOX 404 disclosure 
period than in the pre-SOX 404 disclosure period. 
Impact of ICW Remediation on Loan Features 
In this subsection, we conduct another within-firm analysis to examine whether loan 
rates charged to ICW borrowers decrease after they remediate their internal control problems. 
For this purpose, we identify a sample of firms that disclose ICW under SOX 404 in a year 
and then report that its internal control is effective in a later year. In so doing, we further 
require these remediating firms to have loans initiated in both the pre-remediation period 
(from the disclosure date of ICW to the remediation date)25 and the post-remediation period 
(from the remediation date to two years after). Following the same procedures described in 
the last subsection, we match the loans in the two periods and compute the mean and median 
changes in loan characteristics for the remediating firms. 
The results, as reported in Table 7, Panel D, show that the mean and median changes 
in loan rate around the ICW remediation for 32 firms are –22.078 and –7.500, respectively, 
significant at the five percent and one percent levels, respectively. The significant decrease in 
loan rate in the post-remediation period suggests that firms enjoy a meaningful reduction in 
the cost of bank loans after ICW remediation. With regard to changes in nonprice terms, we 
find that, compared with loans in the pre-remediation period, loans initiated in the 
post-remediation period are less likely to be secured by collateral (at the ten percent level) 
and tend to include fewer financial covenants (at the ten percent level) and fewer general 
covenants (at the five percent level). Overall, the analyses of remediating firms provide 
                                                 
25 The remediation date refers to the date of the firm’s first clean-opinion internal control disclosure under SOX 
404 after its previous ICW disclosure. The average length of the pre-remediation period for 32 firms in our 
sample is about 463 days, or 1.27 years. 
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further evidence that auditor-attested internal control disclosures under SOX 404 are 
informative to banks. 
Using a sample of SOX 302 disclosures, Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) 
conclude that “there is no pricing effect after the ICW is corrected,” which appears to be 
inconsistent with our results. Note, however, that their study compares interest rates for loans 
initiated after ICW remediation (the “corrected” period) to those initiated before ICW 
disclosure (the “prior” period).26 In contrast, we compare the interest rates for loans initiated 
after ICW remediation with those for loans initiated after ICW disclosure but before ICW 
remediation. As a matter of fact, Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman’s (2011) results are 
somewhat consistent with ours: For example, in column 1 of their Table 4, the coefficient on 
Uncorrected is about 29 bps and significantly positive, while the coefficient of Corrected is 
nearly zero and insignificant. Therefore, the insignificant coefficient for the Corrected 
indicator variable can also be interpreted in such a way that the loan rate decreases 
significantly relative to that in the uncorrected period after ICW remediation, and returns to 
its prior period level. 
ICW and Default Risk 
An important remaining challenge is to rule out the possibility that our test variable 
Weak simply captures differences in default risk (rather than the lack of reporting system 
quality) between ICW and non-ICW firms, thereby leading us to observe differences in 
various loan terms between the two. To address this possibility, we examine whether Weak 
has the ability to predict the actual occurrence of defaults observed for our sample firms. If 
Weak is merely a proxy for default risk, but not for reporting system quality, we expect it to 
be a significant predictor of actual defaults or bankruptcies. If Weak captures information risk 
                                                 
26 Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) include both the Uncorrected and Corrected indicator variables in 
the model, which means the loan rate in the prior period is used as the benchmark to interpret the coefficients for 
the Uncorrected and Corrected indicator variables. See Table 4 of Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) for 
details.  
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rather than the measured default risk, we expect its predictive ability with respect to actual 
defaults to be insignificant. Following the recent bankruptcy prediction literature (e.g., 
Shumway 2001; Chava and Jarrow 2004; Chava et al. 2009), we estimate the Cox (1972) 
proportional hazard model to assess the ability of our ICW measures to predict actual defaults 
observed for the borrowing firms in our sample. We obtain data on actual default events from 
Moody’s Corporate Default Risk Service. The results from the hazard model estimations, 
though not reported here, show no evidence that Weak, Company-ICW, and Account-ICW 
predict the occurrence of actual defaults. This finding is inconsistent with the view that our 
ICW measures simply capture default risk rather than information risk associated with the 
lack of adequate internal controls. 
Deal-Level Analyses 
Thus far, we have conducted our empirical analyses at the loan facility level; in other 
words, we consider each loan facility to be an independent observation. However, 
facility-level loan features in a deal may not be independent, as borrowers may have 
negotiated loan terms with lenders at the deal level. To address this concern, we construct a 
reduced sample of 2,334 observations at the loan-deal level and then re-estimate our main 
regressions. In so doing, we compute the average of the facility-level values of various loan 
features across multiple facilities in a deal, using facility size as a weight. Though not 
reported here, the inferences from the deal-level regression results are identical to those from 
the facility-level regression results reported in Table 5 and 6. 
Joint Determination of Loan Terms 
To some extent, various loan contract terms can be jointly determined. However, the 
syndicated loan literature indicates that nonprice terms are normally determined before 
setting the loan interest rate in the syndication process (e.g., Dennis et al. 2000; Bharath. 
2009; Ivashina 2009). Nonetheless, we address the possible joint determination of price and 
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nonprice terms by estimating a system of equations using the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) procedure.27 Unreported results show that the SUR results are very similar to those 
reported in Tables 5 and 6.28 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a sample of 3,164 loan facility–years for borrowers that filed SOX 404 
disclosures with the SEC during 2005–2009, this study compares the price and nonprice 
terms of loan contracts between borrowers with ICW problems and borrowers without such 
problems, after controlling for loan-specific, borrower-specific, and economy-wide factors 
known to affect contract terms. We find that ICW firms incur higher direct and indirect costs 
of bank loans than non-ICW firms. In addition, using a within-firm analysis, we show that 
banks charge significantly higher interest rates for loans initiated after the disclosure of ICW 
under SOX 404 than for loans initiated before the disclosure. This finding suggests that SOX 
404 disclosure is informative to banks and other private lenders. Finally, we find evidence 
that banks charge lower loan rates for ICW firms after the remediation of internal control 
problems  reported under SOX 404. 
Overall, our results indicate that banks take into account the quality of internal control 
over financial reporting when setting the price and nonprice terms of loan contracts. This 
finding suggests that credit stakeholders in the private debt market view material weaknesses 
in internal controls over financial reporting as an information-risk–increasing factor that is 
incrementally significant, beyond traditional credit risk factors.  
                                                 
27 The SUR equations include models with the following dependent variables: loan pricing, collateral, financial 
covenants, general covenants, and number of lenders. 
28 As an additional robustness test for loan pricing results, we control for nonprice terms in the loan pricing 
model and find that the results reported in Table 5 are robust to the inclusion of nonprice terms as additional 
loan-specific controls (untabulated here). 
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Weak An indicator variable that equals one if the auditor concludes a firm’s internal 
control over financial reporting is not effective under SOX 404, and zero otherwise. 
The data on SOX 404 disclosures are from the Audit Analytics database. 
Account ICW An indicator variable that equals one if a borrowing firm reports any account-level 
ICW, and zero otherwise. Data on SOX disclosures are from the Audit Analytics 
database. 
Company ICW An indicator variable that equals one if a firm reports any company-level ICW or 
did not complete an internal control assessment, and zero otherwise. Data on SOX 
disclosures are from the Audit Analytics database.
Borrower-specific variables 
Size Firm size, which is the natural log of total assets in millions of dollars (Compustat 
data item 6). 
Leverage Leverage ratio, defined as the long-term debt (Compustat data item 9) divided by 
total assets (Compustat data item 6).
MB Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt (Compustat data item 6 – Compustat data item 60 + Compustat data item 25 × 
Compustat data item 199) divided by total assets (Compustat data item 6). 
Profitability EBIDTA (Compustat data item 13) divided by total assets (Compustat data item 6).
Tangibility Net PP&E (Compustat data item 8) divided by total assets (Compustat data item 6).
CashVol Cash flow volatility, measured by the standard deviation of quarterly cash flows 
from operations (change in quarterly Compustat data item 108) scaled by total 
assets (Compustat data item 6) over the past five fiscal years. 
RDefaultRisk Decile rank of the first principal component of three commonly used default risk 
proxies: Altman’s (1968) Z–score, Ohlson’s (1980) O–score, and Shumway’s (2001) 
probability of bankruptcy (–0.7999 × Z-Score+ 0.8948 × O-Score+ 0.6239 × 
Probability of Bankruptcy). Larger values indicate higher default risk. 
AbsAccr The absolute value of abnormal accruals obtained from the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995) considering accounting conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar 
2006). 
Restate An indicator variable that equals one if the firm restates its financial statements in 
the year of disclosing ICWs under SOX 404. 
Rated An indicator variable that equals one if the borrower has an S&P Domestic Long 
Term Issuer Credit Rating (Compustat data item 280), and zero otherwise.
Big 4 An indicator variable that equals one if the auditor of a borrower is one of the Big 4 
auditors, and zero otherwise.
Age The number of years the firm has data in Compustat.
Log Age The natural log of Age.
NSegment The number of the firm’s business segment reported by Compustat segments.
Log Segment The natural log of NSegment.
Inventory Inventory (Compustat data item 3) divided by total assets (Compustat data item 6).
M&A An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is involved in mergers or 
acquisitions, and zero otherwise (Compustat AFNT item 1). 
Foreign An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a nonzero foreign currency 
translation (Compustat data item 150), and zero otherwise.
Restructure An indicator variable that equals one if any of Compustat data items 376, 377, 378, 
36 
and 379 are nonzero, and zero otherwise.
SaleGrowth Growth rate in sales (Compustat data item 12).
Loss An indicator variable that equals one if the firm has negative aggregate earnings 
before extraordinary items (Compustat data item 18) in the last and current fiscal 
years, and zero otherwise.
Loan-specific variables 
AIS The dependent variable, which is measured by the drawn all-in spread charged by 
the bank over the LIBOR for the drawn portion of the loan facility, obtained from 
the DealScan database.
Maturity The maturity of the loan in months
Log Maturity The natural log of Maturity.
Loan Size The amount of the loan facility in millions of dollars.
Log Loan Size The natural log of Loan Size.
Deal Size The dollar amount of the loan deal.
Log Deal Size The natural log of DealSize.
NLenders The number of banks in the loan deal. 
Log NLenders The natural log of NLenders.
Performance 
Pricing 
An indicator variable that equals one if the loan contract includes performance 
pricing provisions, and zero otherwise.
DSecured An indicator variable that equals one if the loan facility is secured with collateral, 
and zero otherwise.
FinCovIndex Financial covenant index constructed by counting the number of financial covenants 
included in a loan contract. 
GenCovIndex General covenant index constructed by counting the number of general covenants 
included in a loan contract. 
Loan 
Concentration 
Deal Size divided by the sum of Deal Size and the borrower’s total liabilities 
(Compustat data item 181).   
Prior Lead An indicator variable that equals one if at least one of the lead arrangers for the 
current deal has been a lead arranger of previous deals for the same borrower during 
the past five years, and zero otherwise. 
Lead Reputation An indicator variable that equals one if at least one of the lead arrangers for the loan 
deal was a top-25 U.S. lead arranger (in terms of loan volume) in the year before the 
initiation of the loan based on the loan data from DealScan, and zero otherwise. 
Loan Purpose 
Indicators 
A series of the indicator variables for the purposes of loan facilities in DealScan, 
including corporate purposes, debt repayment, working capital, CP backup, 
takeover, and acquisition line.
Loan Type 
Indicators 
A series of indicator variables for the types of loan facilities in DealScan, including 
term loan, revolvers, and 364-day facilities.
Macroeconomic variables 
Term Spread Difference in the yield between 10-year and two-year U.S. Treasury bonds 
measured one month before the loan becomes active, obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors.
Credit Spread Difference in the yield between BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bonds measured 





Sample Selection and Distribution by Year and Loan Type. 
 
 





Loans to public companies available in 
DealScan from 2005 to 2009 
3,153 9,827 
Less:    
Loans initiated before borrowers have 
SOX 404 disclosure data available in 
Audit Analytics 
(1,069) (3,970) 
Loans borrowed by companies in the 
financial industry  
(320) (961) 
Non–senior debts, bridge loans, bonds, 
letter of credit, and other non-fund-based 
facilities 
(13) (292) 
Observations missing necessary data 
items for tests 
(388) (1,440) 
Total observations 1,363 3,164 
 
 








2005 178 461 27 666 
2006 230 627 20 877 
2007 264 556 35 855 
2008 138 297 37 472 
2009 77 201 16 294 
Total 887 2,142 135 3,164 






Panel A: Loan Facility Characteristics 
 








AIS (bps) 3,164 186.414 75.000 150.000 250.00 159.147 
Maturity (months) 3,164 52.898 37.000 60.000 60.000 20.604 
Loan Size (millions) 3,164 478.473 85.000 200.000 500.000 949.409
Performance Pricing 3,164 0.595 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.491
DSecured 2,522 0.681 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.466
FinCovIndex 3,164 1.654 0.000 2.000 3.000 1.294
GenCovIndex 3,164 3.732 1.000 3.000 6.000 2.967
NLenders 3,164 9.067 4.000 7.000 12.000 7.980
 
Panel B: Borrowing Firm Characteristics 
 








Weak 3,164 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.295 
Account ICW 3,164 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.201 
Company ICW 3,164 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.226 
Size 3,164 7.320 6.198 7.247 8.330 1.532 
Leverage 3,164 0.230 0.073 0.200 0.331 0.203 
MB 3,164 1.926 1.217 1.525 2.104 3.494 
Profitability 3,164 0.129 0.089 0.123 0.177 0.136 
Tangibility 3,164 0.308 0.115 0.238 0.462 0.240 
CashVol 3,164 0.044 0.014 0.022 0.035 0.436 
RDefaultRisk 3,164 0.501 0.222 0.444 0.778 0.320 
AbsAccr 3,164 0.293 0.028 0.076 0.306 0.448 
Restate 3,164 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.301 
Big 4 3,164 0.924 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.265 
Firm Age 3,164 24.508 10.000 17.000 39.000 17.117 
NSegment 3,164 2.838 1.000 3.000 4.000 1.821 
Inventory 3,164 0.114 0.009 0.082 0.171 0.125 
M&A 3,164 0.261 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.439 
Foreign 3,164 0.277 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.448 
Restructure 3,164 0.355 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.479 
Sales Growth 3,164 0.178 0.030 0.104 0.209 0.647 




Comparisons of Loan and Firm Characteristics 
 




Borrowers with effective 
internal control
(2)
Borrowers with ineffective 
internal control
Test for difference 
(2)–(1) 
N Mean Median N Mean Median t Z 
AIS (bps) 2,860 179.492 150.000 304 251.535 200.000 7.00*** 8.58*** 
Maturity (months) 2,860 53.094 60.000 304 51.049 60.000 –1.52 –1.95* 
Loan Size  
(millions) 2,860 502.657 221.650 304 250.952 150.000 –9.94*** –5.55*** 
Performance 
Pricing 2,860 0.603 1.000 304 0.520 0.000 –2.82*** –2.82*** 
DSecured 2,262 0.659 1.000 260 0.873 1.000 9.34*** 7.02*** 
FinCovIndex 2,860 1.626 2.000 304 1.918 2.000 3.75*** 3.59*** 
GenCovIndex 2,860 3.612 3.000 304 4.865 5.000 6.64*** 6.77*** 
NLenders 2,860 9.337 7.000 304 6.530 5.000 –7.46*** –6.26*** 
Size 2,860 7.361 7.296 304 6.937 6.792 –4.94*** –4.92*** 
Leverage 2,860 0.225 0.198 304 0.273 0.225 3.02*** 1.90* 
MB 2,860 1.955 1.543 304 1.645 1.365 –3.60*** –5.15*** 
Profitability 2,860 0.133 0.127 304 0.093 0.085 –6.03*** –9.84*** 
Tangibility 2,860 0.308 0.237 304 0.308 0.269 0.07 –0.06 
CashVol 2,860 0.045 0.021 304 0.035 0.024 –1.16 3.73*** 
RDefaultRisk 2,860 0.480 0.444 304 0.694 0.778 11.39*** 11.07*** 
AbsAccr 2,860 0.275 0.072 304 0.458 0.163 5.48*** 5.65*** 
Restate 2,860 0.066 0.000 304 0.428 0.000 12.55*** 19.90*** 
Big 4 2,860 0.926 1.000 304 0.911 1.000 –0.84 –0.90 
Age 2,860 24.846 18.000 304 21.326 14.000 –3.42*** –4.45*** 
NSegment 2,860 2.824 3.000 304 2.970 3.000 1.33 1.62 
Inventory 2,860 0.114 0.082 304 0.116 0.086 0.32 0.13 
M&A 2,860 0.262 0.000 304 0.257 0.000 –0.19 –0.19 
Foreign 2,860 0.264 0.000 304 0.408 0.000 4.90*** 5.34*** 
Restructure 2,860 0.343 0.000 304 0.470 0.000 4.44*** 4.42*** 
SaleGrowth 2,860 0.180 0.106 304 0.152 0.072 –1.14 –2.28** 















Test for difference 
(2)–(1) 
N Mean Median N Mean Median t Z 
AIS (bps) 133 220.575 175.000 171 275.614 225.000 2.89*** 2.67*** 
Maturity (months) 133 51.053 60.000 171 51.047 60.000 –0.00 –0.73 
Loan Size (millions) 133 259.249 175.000 171 244.498 125.000 –0.43 –1.86* 
Performance Pricing 133 0.556 1.000 171 0.491 0.000 –1.13 –1.13 
DSecured 109 0.789 1.000 151 0.934 1.000 3.28*** 3.45*** 
FinCovIndex 133 1.880 2.000 171 1.947 2.000 0.44 0.80 
GenCovIndex 133 4.767 5.000 171 4.942 5.000 0.48 0.71 
NLenders 133 7.075 5.000 171 6.105 5.000 –1.31 –0.68 
Size 133 6.953 6.741 171 6.923 6.798 –0.18 0.01 
Leverage 133 0.259 0.214 171 0.285 0.243 0.84 1.23 
MB 133 1.768 1.406 171 1.548 1.331 –2.02** –2.04** 
Profitability 133 0.090 0.082 171 0.095 0.088 0.38 0.26 
Tangibility 133 0.348 0.334 171 0.278 0.210 –2.57** –2.50** 
CashVol 133 0.036 0.029 171 0.035 0.022 –0.28 –0.90 
RDefaultRisk 133 0.680 0.778 171 0.704 0.778 0.68 0.48 
AbsAccr 133 0.425 0.122 171 0.483   0.176 0.89 0.85 
Restate 133 0.519 1.000 171 0.357 0.000 –2.86*** –2.83*** 
Big 4 133 0.925 1.000 171 0.901 1.000 –0.73 –0.73 
Age 133 17.752 11.000 171 24.105 16.000 3.33*** 3.89*** 
NSegment 133 2.752 3.000 171 3.140 3.000 1.94* 1.93* 
Inventory 133 0.100 0.064 171 0.128 0.103 1.84* 2.24** 
M&A 133 0.211 0.000 171 0.292 0.000 1.62 1.62 
Foreign 133 0.353 0.000 171 0.450 0.000 1.71* 1.70* 
Restructure 133 0.481 0.000 171 0.462 0.000 –0.33 –0.33 
SaleGrowth 133 0.126 0.072 171 0.173 0.072 1.17 0.72 
Loss 133 0.444 0.000 171 0.450 0.000 0.12 0.12 
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
TABLE 4 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 





















AIS 1.00                    
Weak 0.13*** 1.00                   
Account 
ICW 0.04** 0.64*** 1.00                  
Company 
ICW 0.13*** 0.73*** –0.05*** 1.00                 
Log 
Maturity –0.10*** –0.02 –0.01 –0.02 1.00                
Log 
Loan Size –0.35*** –0.10*** –0.04** –0.09*** 0.16*** 1.00               
Log 
NLenders –0.31*** –0.10*** –0.06*** –0.08*** 0.28*** 0.61*** 1.00              
Performance 
Pricing –0.28*** –0.05*** –0.02 –0.05*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.26*** 1.00             
DSecured 0.47*** 0.14*** 0.05** 0.14*** 0.10*** –0.31*** –0.24*** –0.27*** 1.00            
FinCovIndex 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.04** 0.05*** 0.08*** –0.18*** 0.00 0.47*** 0.11*** 1.00           
GenCovIndex 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.14*** –0.10*** 0.05*** 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.62*** 1.00          
Size –0.30*** –0.08*** –0.05*** –0.06*** –0.02 0.75*** 0.52*** 0.02 –0.38*** –0.29*** –0.20*** 1.00         
Leverage 0.17*** 0.07*** 0.03* 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.11*** –0.12*** 0.17*** –0.04** 0.06*** 0.19*** 1.00        
MB 0.02 –0.03 –0.01 –0.03 –0.01 –0.05** –0.02 –0.03 –0.00 0.01 0.02 –0.18*** –0.09*** 1.00       
Profitability –0.24*** –0.09*** –0.06*** –0.06*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.14*** –0.14*** 0.04** –0.02 0.16*** –0.01 –0.61*** 1.00      
Tangibility –0.00 0.00 0.04** –0.03* –0.06*** 0.17*** 0.07*** 0.01 –0.07*** –0.07*** –0.08*** 0.20*** 0.27*** –0.08*** 0.11*** 1.00     
CashVol 0.08*** –0.01 –0.00 –0.01 –0.00 –0.06** –0.02 –0.04** 0.03* 0.01 0.03* –0.16*** –0.05** 0.96*** –0.70*** –0.05*** 1.00    
RDefaultRisk 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.15*** –0.05*** –0.04** –0.06*** –0.17*** 0.23*** –0.05*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.62*** –0.06*** –0.37*** 0.24*** 0.05*** 1.00   
AbsAccr 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.06*** 0.10*** –0.04** –0.11*** –0.09*** –0.05*** 0.09*** 0.04** 0.05*** –0.10*** 0.02 –0.00 –0.01 –0.10*** –0.02 0.04** 1.00  
Restate 0.04** 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.20*** –0.00 –0.01 –0.04** –0.01 0.05** 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05*** –0.02 –0.05*** 0.06*** –0.01 0.11*** 0.01 1.00 
 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
42 
TABLE 5 





Test variables   
Weak 28.189***  
 (2.72)  
Account ICW  7.093 
  (0.58) 
Company ICW  43.656*** 
  (3.07) 
Loan–specific characteristics
Log Maturity –10.927 –10.983 
 (–1.28) (–1.28) 
Log Loan Size –10.088*** –9.859*** 
 (–3.59) (–3.51) 
Log NLenders –2.281 –2.364 
 (–0.59) (–0.61) 
Performance Pricing –30.237*** –29.994*** 
 (–5.84) (–5.81) 
 Borrower–specific characteristics
Size –11.479*** –11.581*** 
 (–3.88) (–3.89) 
Leverage 55.646** 54.735** 
 (2.20) (2.16) 
MB –14.017*** –13.843*** 
 (–4.67) (–4.65) 
Profitability –89.181* –91.248* 
 (–1.76) (–1.80) 
Tangibility 12.293 15.492 
 (0.63) (0.79) 
CashVol 104.465*** 102.778*** 
 (3.68) (3.64) 
RDefaultRisk 42.111** 41.597** 
 (2.54) (2.53) 
AbsAccr 5.584 4.862 
 (0.77) (0.66) 
Restate 4.352 5.637 
 (0.53) (0.70) 
Big 4 –13.197 –12.905 
 (–1.00) (–0.98) 
Log Age –14.194*** –14.834*** 
 (–3.11) (–3.27) 
Log Segment 0.661 0.512 
 (0.17) (0.13) 
Inventory –31.201 –32.231 
 (–1.04) (–1.08) 
M&A 0.203 –0.100 
 (0.04) (–0.02) 
Foreign 4.635 4.389 
 (0.72) (0.68) 
Restructure 0.312 0.604 
 (0.05) (0.10) 




















N denotes the number of observations used in each model. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 (–1.77) (–1.81) 
Loss 64.673*** 64.723*** 
 (7.18) (7.18) 
Macroeconomic factors   
Term Spread 56.368*** 56.762*** 
 (5.02) (5.05) 
Credit Spread 32.406*** 32.471*** 
 (2.97) (2.98) 
Intercept and indicators   
Intercept 469.188*** 468.601*** 
 (8.59) (8.56) 
Loan Type Indicators Included Included 
Loan Purpose  
Indicators Included Included 
Year Indicators Included Included 
Industry Indicators Included Included 
N 3,164 3,164 
Adj. R2  0.56 0.56 
TABLE 6 
Effects of ICW on Collateral Requirements, Covenant Restrictions, and the Number of Lenders 
 
Variable 
DSecured FinCovIndex GenCovIndex NLenders 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Test variables 
Weak 0.413**  0.119**  0.217***  –0.124**  
 (2.46)  (2.03)  (3.96)  (–1.98)  
Account ICW  –0.109  0.059  0.159*  –0.121 
  (–0.60)  (0.68)  (1.79)  (–1.05) 
Company ICW  0.937***  0.163**  0.261***  –0.126** 
  (3.50)  (2.29)  (4.25)  (–2.02) 
Loan-specific characteristics 
Log Maturity 0.105 0.092 –0.015 –0.016 0.010 0.009 0.235*** 0.235*** 
 (1.16) (1.03) (–0.38) (–0.41) (0.24) (0.22) (7.55) (7.56) 
Loan Concentration 2.009*** 2.036***       
 (4.97) (5.02)       
Log Deal Size   0.027 0.028 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.314*** 0.314*** 
   (0.97) (0.99) (6.21) (6.23) (12.76) (12.76) 
Log NLenders –0.065 –0.060 0.038 0.038 –0.003 –0.004   
 (–0.88) (–0.81) (1.29) (1.28) (–0.11) (–0.13)   
Performance Pricing –0.420*** –0.415*** 0.827*** 0.829*** 0.781*** 0.782***   
 (–3.75) (–3.66) (17.40) (17.37) (16.17) (16.08)   
Prior Lead –0.175** –0.177** 0.015 0.016 –0.007 –0.006 0.166*** 0.165*** 
 (–2.09) (–2.09) (0.47) (0.50) (–0.21) (–0.17) (4.72) (4.74) 
Lead Reputation       0.569*** 0.569*** 
       (8.74) (8.76) 
Borrower-specific characteristics
Size –0.323*** –0.324*** –0.171*** –0.171*** –0.191*** –0.191*** 0.047* 0.047* 
 (–5.10) (–5.17) (–8.06) (–8.08) (–8.00) (–8.01) (1.92) (1.92) 
Leverage 2.306*** 2.274*** 0.205 0.201 0.319** 0.314** 0.221 0.221 
 (5.00) (4.96) (1.63) (1.60) (2.46) (2.42) (1.31) (1.31) 
MB –0.258*** –0.252*** –0.098*** –0.097*** –0.064*** –0.063*** –0.029 –0.029 
 (–4.50) (–4.45) (–4.98) (–4.95) (–3.09) (–3.06) (–1.28) (–1.28) 
Profitability –1.486* –1.524* 0.639*** 0.632*** –0.106 –0.113 –0.500** –0.500** 
 (–1.78) (–1.83) (2.83) (2.79) (–0.48) (–0.51) (–2.03) (–2.02) 
Tangibility –0.692* –0.691* 0.026 0.032 –0.005 0.002 0.289* 0.288* 
 (–1.74) (–1.74) (0.22) (0.27) (–0.04) (0.01) (1.89) (1.90) 
CashVol 6.425** 6.270** 0.856*** 0.849*** 0.433** 0.424** 0.253 0.253 
 (2.40) (2.33) (5.07) (5.04) (2.45) (2.42) (1.30) (1.31) 
RDefaultRisk 1.222*** 1.208*** –0.028 –0.03 0.149 0.148 –0.15 –0.15 
 (3.92) (3.91) (–0.30) (–0.32) (1.55) (1.54) (–1.36) (–1.36) 
AbsAccr 0.164 0.172 –0.061 –0.063 –0.039 –0.041 –0.051 –0.051 
 (1.41) (1.47) (–1.36) (–1.40) (–0.83) (–0.87) (–0.90) (–0.90) 
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Restate 0.173 0.221 –0.015 –0.01 –0.006 –0.002 –0.066 –0.066 
 (1.12) (1.43) (–0.26) (–0.18) (–0.11) (–0.04) (–1.25) (–1.27) 
Rated       0.055 0.055 
       (1.19) (1.19) 
Big 4 0.189 0.220 –0.043 –0.042 0.048 0.049 0.151** 0.151** 
 (0.96) (1.12) (–0.78) (–0.77) (0.73) (0.75) (2.34) (2.35) 
Log Age –0.383*** –0.406*** –0.049* –0.051* –0.062** –0.065** –0.03 –0.03 
 (–5.23) (–5.54) (–1.69) (–1.76) (–2.09) (–2.19) (–1.09) (–1.09) 
Log Segment 0.040 0.039 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.007 
 (0.51) (0.49) (0.45) (0.42) (0.22) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) 
Inventory 0.361 0.279 –0.256 –0.26 –0.081 –0.083 0.479** 0.480** 
 (0.61) (0.46) (–1.25) (–1.28) (–0.38) (–0.40) (2.29) (2.29) 
M&A 0.019 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.018 0.103** 0.103** 
 (0.19) (0.13) (0.32) (0.31) (0.50) (0.50) (2.36) (2.36) 
Foreign 0.012 0.008 0.015 0.014 0.045 0.045 0.007 0.007 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.37) (0.36) (1.09) (1.08) (0.15) (0.15) 
Restructure –0.003 –0.013 0.006 0.007 –0.02 –0.018 –0.015 –0.015 
 (–0.03) (–0.12) (0.17) (0.19) (–0.50) (–0.47) (–0.37) (–0.37) 
SaleGrowth 0.578*** 0.557*** 0.019 0.018 –0.008 –0.008 –0.032 –0.032 
 (3.05) (2.93) (1.03) (1.00) (–0.39) (–0.40) (–1.12) (–1.12) 
Loss 0.617*** 0.646*** 0.058 0.059 0.186*** 0.187*** –0.262*** –0.262*** 
 (3.46) (3.59) (1.02) (1.03) (3.42) (3.45) (–4.17) (–4.20) 
Macroeconomic factors 
Term Spread 0.302** 0.316** 0.053 0.055 0.067 0.069 0.035 0.035 
 (2.01) (2.07) (0.96) (0.98) (1.13) (1.16) (0.58) (0.58) 
Credit Spread 0.060 0.066 0.094** 0.095** 0.156*** 0.157*** –0.054 –0.054 
 (0.42) (0.46) (2.00) (2.02) (3.06) (3.07) (–1.35) (–1.35) 
Intercept and indicators 
Intercept 8.295*** 8.251*** 1.012** 1.014** –1.135** –1.133** –6.194*** –6.194*** 
 (9.45) (9.58) (2.08) (2.08) (–2.32) (–2.32) (–13.11) (–13.11) 
Loan Type Indicators Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Loan Purpose 
Indicators Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Indicators Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Indicators Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 2,522 2,522 3,164 3,164 3,164 3,164 3,164 3,164 
Pseudo R2 0.46 0.46 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.35 0.35 
 
N denotes the number of observations used in each model. Columns (1a) and (1b) are Probit regressions, and Columns (2a)-(4b) are Poisson regressions. The 
Z-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
TABLE 7 
Changes in Loan Terms 
 




∆DSecured ∆Fin CovIndex 
∆Gen 
CovIndex ∆NLenders 
Mean 22.581* 0.062 –0.831*** –0.238 –2.600 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: Changes in Loan Terms between Pre- and Post-SOX 404 Periods for 46 ICW Firms That 




∆DSecured ∆Fin CovIndex 
∆Gen 
CovIndex ∆NLenders 
Mean 34.896** 0.087* –0.761*** –0.098 –1.543* 
Median 6.250*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 




∆DSecured ∆Fin CovIndex 
∆Gen 
CovIndex ∆NLenders 
Mean –24.967*** 0.017 –0.435*** –0.240* –0.316 
Median –25.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 





∆DSecured ∆Fin CovIndex 
∆Gen 
CovIndex ∆NLenders 
Mean –22.078** –0.130* –0.656* –1.641** –2.375 
Median –7.500*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel A presents the mean and median of the changes in loan characteristics for 65 ICW firms within two years 
before and after the firms’ first-time SOX 404 disclosures. Panel B presents the mean and median of the changes in 
loan characteristics for 46 ICW firms that did not disclose ICW under SOX 302. Panel C presents the mean and 
median of the changes in loan characteristics for 373 non-ICW firms within two years before and after the firms’ 
first-time SOX 404 disclosures. Panel D presents the mean and median of the changes in loan characteristics for 32 
firms around their remediating ICW. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
in a two-tailed test. 
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